

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 17-05-2007		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Japan and Iraq: A Comparison		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER		
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) LCDR Hans De For Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A		5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
		5e. TASK NUMBER		
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.				
14. ABSTRACT Current stability operations in Iraq are in danger of failing due to political pressure at home and abroad. Security issues and a longstanding perception of illegitimacy for the entire operation continue to exacerbate the problem of fully and successfully transitioning to a democratic, friendly, Iraqi government. A significant portion of the U.S. population now desires a full military withdrawal from Iraq. This paper compares the successful occupation of Japan and ongoing stability operations in Iraq. Specifically, it looks at the historical context of both operations, the operational structure of the respective occupation forces, and the major decisions made prior to and during the early days of both operations and their impacts. It answers the question of why both operations had significantly differing outcomes by examining their overall character. Finally, the paper draws conclusions from both case studies and makes recommendations for future stability operations.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS Japan, Iraq, Occupation, Stability Operations				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 18
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		
				19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
				19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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Japan and Iraq: A Comparison
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Colonel Charles P. Tench's C-46 transport plane rolled to a stop at Atsugi airfield, near Tokyo early on the 28th of August, 1945. Now a very familiar airfield to US Navy pilots, Atsugi was still enemy territory in late summer of 1945. Three and a half years of mortal struggle weighed upon this Colonel from MacArthur's G-3 staff as he climbed down the ladder onto the airfield.ⁱ This was the beginning of the end. Colonel Tench was the first of hundreds of thousands of Allied troops who would soon follow. By October, 1945, 232, 379 Allied troops were on the Japanese Home Islands. A devastated nation of over 80 million lay prostrate.ⁱⁱ The culmination of three years of serious planning, the occupation of Japan, codenamed Operation Blacklist, was in full swing.ⁱⁱⁱ

Less than seven years after it started, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP), headquartered in Tokyo, officially ended its mission. Though not a perfect operation, by all accounts it was a tremendous success. Japan's economy would rise from utter devastation to powerhouse status in the next thirty years. Japan would become one of America's closest friends and each nation's culture and technology would heavily influence the other.

Four years after the end of major combat operations in Iraq, American troop levels are approaching 200,000 soldiers. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent, and the amount of progress being made in the face of a violent insurgency is debated daily. A large percentage of Americans want the President to cut our losses and to bring the troops home.

Why such different outcomes? What lessons at the operational level can be learned from the experiences of the American occupation forces in Japan? What lessons can be learned for future operations? The answer to all of these questions is legitimacy. Since the will of the people is almost always a center of gravity for the entire range of conflicts,

legitimacy, both at home and in the occupied nation itself, is the key. Lack of legitimacy exacerbates any military, political, or diplomatic problems involved in the operation. Legitimacy is more than just a legal right to invade and occupy a nation. It is also the perception that the occupiers are correcting an injustice and are returning life to normalcy or making life better for everyone. Working through the existing government, the power of ideas, consistency of command, and, by far the most important, security, are all force multipliers for stability operations. Legitimacy should be at the core of every Phase IV operation and should be what every aspect of that operation is designed around.

Legitimacy At Home And Abroad

Always a center of gravity for any operation, the will of the people – the will of all parties involved - is especially important in peacekeeping operations. While very difficult to plan for at an operational level, legitimacy at home and abroad has profound impacts on any Phase IV operation. Legitimacy is what holds these operations together.

Professor Waghelstein calls the ideal conflict, from a political standpoint, a “Two-Fer”. A “Two-Fer” is a conflict where there is both a clear, wide-spread moral imperative to go to war and a clear, wide-spread political imperative. Such conflicts allow the greatest freedom of action and are the most forgiving where error is concerned. These conflicts are legitimate wars in the hearts and minds of your nation and your allies. The conflict can be expected to continue until the foe is vanquished. If one of the two imperatives are not present (or are seen as weak), management of the conflict is bound to suffer. Bosnia is an example where there was a moral imperative to intervene, but no political imperative. Korea might be seen as a conflict where there was a political imperative, but not a strong moral imperative. Both conflicts stumbled in the court of opinion at home.^{iv}

This was not the case with Japan, however. Japan was an international pariah in 1945. Japanese troops had conducted aggressive warfare since at least 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria. Every nation in East Asia and most of the colonial powers still had the Japanese Army occupying a part of their soil in August 1945. There was no question in the minds of Americans as to what post-war US policy toward Japan should be. As the most powerful of the Allies in the Pacific at the end of the war and the de facto head of the newly formed United Nations, the US could frame peacekeeping operations however it deemed necessary. Truman, MacArthur, and the Joint Chiefs could expect little or no hindrances from the international community. Because of this legitimacy, the fire bombing of Tokyo and the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for instance, were not the subject of heated contemporary discussion. The US was able to dictate the terms of the occupation without debate.

In contrast, occupying Iraq is proving far more difficult. Iraq is anything but a “Two-Fer”. Long before a UN resolution calling for a military solution to the Iraq problem was defeated in the Security Council, the legitimacy of going to war in Iraq was hotly disputed both at home and abroad. Very few of the nations that the US expected to provide assistance for stability operations in Iraq actually sent troops because of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s questionable legitimacy as a just war. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, long term allies in the fight against Saddam Hussein, did not allow US forces use of their territory during OIF. Stability operations in Iraq now suffer because of this.

Any misstep in Iraq, no matter how large or small, valid or otherwise, is tried in the international court of opinion and further erodes what remains of the occupation’s legitimacy. Because of the antics of a few unsupervised soldiers, Abu Ghraib prison has become a

symbol of everything that is wrong with this conflict and with America itself. Congress has now approved a withdrawal timetable for US troops from Iraq (vetoed by President Bush) and there is much talk of removing funding to the troops there. A “strategic corporal” is a junior military member, who, through their actions, usually detrimental, has a profound impact on the battlefield far greater than his paygrade should warrant. There was very little chance of Congress defunding troops in Japan, or that a “strategic corporal” could cause an early pullout of US forces from Japan. Legitimacy is vital to all operations, but is essential to stability operations.

Legitimacy Among the Occupied

Perceived legitimacy for a conflict is not limited to external entities. Legitimacy as seen by the occupied people is essential. This aspect of legitimacy is what operational planners can affect the most. Working through the existing government, the power of ideas, and security all provide legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. In Japan, this was dramatically achieved by one important decision: to keep the Emperor in power. Japanese devotion to the Emperor, the divine incarnation of the goddess Amaterasu, remained extremely strong throughout the conflict. Protection of the Emperor and his divine land was the key Japanese war aim in the closing days of the war. Viewed by US planners as a key to post-war change, the Emperor wasn't subject to the same type of attack propaganda as the rest of the Japanese military leadership.^v If the Emperor could be seen by the Japanese people as accepting and endorsing the occupation and SCAP's policies, the majority of physical and political resistance to the occupation would be neutralized.

General MacArthur was fully aware of the importance of maintaining this legitimacy among the Japanese. Responding to General Eisenhower's question of whether the Emperor should be tried for war crimes, MacArthur warned General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, that if the Emperor were indicted in war crimes trials, the nation would experience, "a tremendous convulsion", "disintegrate", initiate a "vendetta for revenge... whose cycle may well not be complete for centuries if ever." Government agencies would break down; "civilized practices will largely cease; guerrilla warfare could be expected; all hopes of introducing modern democracy would disappear; and once the occupation forces left, "some form of intense regimentation probably along communistic line[s] would arise from the mutilated masses." MacArthur further declared that he would need at least a million troops, in addition to an imported civil service of several hundred thousand, for an indefinite number of years.^{vi} MacArthur's statement would seem to echo the most dire predictions for the conflict in Iraq today.

Soon after MacArthur took up residence in the Dai-Ichi building in Tokyo in September, 1945, the Emperor was invited to visit. This unprecedented event – the spiritual leader of Japan leaving the Imperial Palace to make obeisance to a foreign occupying power – was the key to cementing the legitimacy of the occupiers in the minds of the Japanese. General MacArthur himself would now assume the role of Shogun: an enlightened despot, and legitimate ruler of Japan. Furthermore, this event, combined with the Emperor's previous radio announcement of the surrender, his denouncement of his divinity in January, 1946, and his public tours of Japan conducted at SCAP insistence in the years after, did much to demystify and humanize the Emperor. As the devotion to the Emperor lessened, the occupation further solidified control and furthered its own legitimacy.

Iraq had no equivalent to Emperor Hirohito. Instead of being the physical embodiment of the divinity of the nation and the race, Saddam Hussein was the brutal ruler of a balkanized nation in the geographical, religious, and ethnic senses. A subject of deep hatred among his people, Iraqis cheered as statues of Hussein tumbled and were drug through the streets in the final days of his regime. Because of his ruthless jealousy of power, there was no single leader in Iraq who could give endorsement, and thus legitimacy to, the Coalition's presence.

Working Through the Existing Government

The Government of Japan continued to be a functioning entity after US troops landed. By working through the GOJ's existing institutions and people, SCAP was able to control the important, strategic if you will, decisions for the occupation of Japan, while still keeping a Japanese face on government. SCAP controlled these institutions through very regular inspections, audits, and general observations by Allied forces. Should an entity from the GOJ fail to implement a directive from MacArthur, SCAP was prepared and able to step in to discipline the member, or even to take over whole portions of the government if needed. "The direct issuance of an order or the taking over of any Japanese governmental agency was to be undertaken only in grave emergencies or when specifically authorized by the Army commander."^{vii} General MacArthur's staff did not have to get involved in the day to day operation of Japan. Police, courts, taxation, etc... was all managed by the existing authorities.^{viii}

This was certainly Jay Garner's plan for Iraq. As then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice noted, "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces. You would be able to

bring in new leadership, but we were going to keep the body in place.”^{ix} However, as US troops entered Iraq and it became clear that Saddam’s regime was falling apart, the Iraqi government vanished into the population. Perhaps exacerbated by the Coalition’s targeting of the regime’s command and control apparatus during the war, the Iraqi government was not in any way functional when Garner’s Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance set up shop in Baghdad in late April, 2003.^x Garner’s staff was nowhere near robust enough to fill the void and he couldn’t count on much support from the military. There were not enough troops available for simple security, much less governance. More so, there was a dearth of knowledge concerning nation building within the military. Although some members of the Iraqi government soon began to report and began to work with the ORHA staff to rebuild the necessary institutions, the effort was hampered by lack of numbers, shattered infrastructure, lack of power, and severe looting.

Any progress was soon reversed after Garner was relieved by Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority stood up. On May 16, 2003, Bremer issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, purging the top levels of the existing Iraqi government. Anyone who had held a senior level position would be assumed to have been a Baathist, and thus suspect. Seen by Bremer as the modern equivalent of the de-Nazification of Germany after World War II, the effect was to alienate tens of thousands of knowledgeable people who had nothing to do with the abuses of Hussein’s Baath party.^{xi} As the Rand Corporation’s *Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building* states, “Blanket exclusions on the basis of membership in political parties or other groups are not usually a good way of undertaking vetting. In Iraq, the decision to ban ranking Baath Party members from public-sector employment meant that large numbers of senior officers in the defense and interior

ministries and security-related services were released from duty, not to mention thousands of schoolteachers and other mid-level functionaries. Some of these individuals were apolitical and had only become party members as a condition of employment.”^{xii}

With the same noble goal of reforming Iraq’s institutions, CPA Order Number 2, the Dissolution of Iraqi Entities, eliminated Iraq’s armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior (which included the police), and the presidential security units. Further, “any person holding the rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a Senior Party Member”. Hundreds of thousands of people became associated with the horrors of the Hussein regime and were legally ostracized and made virtual enemies of the occupation forces.^{xiii}

Finally, Bremer began a policy of closing state-run businesses in an attempt to move Iraq from a very inefficient, oil-based, directed economy, to one that was part of the free-market. The effect of this policy was similar to the effect of Orders One and Two, however. Hundreds of thousands of influential, middle class Iraqis were now unemployed. *The Beginner’s Guide* adds, “In Iraq, the original U.S. [D]ebaathification decree was too sweeping, as its authors now acknowledge, while the United States never put in place an effective process for review and rehabilitation. These early decisions almost certainly contributed to a level of resistance that the U.S.-led coalition was unprepared to counter.”^{xiv} In a poorly thought out attempt to gain legitimacy both internationally and within Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority alienated the very people it needed to court and a violent insurgency was born.

The Power of Ideas

Democracy, freedom of speech, equal protection under the law, gender equality, freedom of religion, and free markets are extremely potent ideas. Recognition of the inalienable rights of the individual is a powerful means to legitimacy. Japan recognized none of these prior to the Occupation. SCAP policies upon arrival were a great, but welcome shock to the Japanese people. These ideas would become the poison pill that kept Japan from reverting to its pre-war ways as soon as the Occupation forces left in 1952. Prior to the war, public dissent of the government was crushed by thought police such as the Kempeitai, Japan's military police. Pre-war Japan's democratic process was manipulated by the military and big business. Wealthy and politically powerful figures were largely above the law. There was no gender equality. Shinto, the state religion, had become a nationalistic tool for the ruling elites. Shinto's militaristic doctrines reached into every schoolroom, teaching the next generation that Japan's glorious destiny would be bloody. Finally, giant, politically powerful businesses manipulated markets and kept labor from organizing. Now the Japanese were exposed to something better and there was no going back.

Japan's right-wing controlled Diet was slow in setting up a constitution that reflected all of the requirements for a democratic Japan as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration. Additionally, MacArthur saw the rising power of the Diet's political left as a threat to the legitimacy of the Emperor. He decided to step in. Japan's new Constitution was essentially written in one week by a small portion of the SCAP staff.^{xv} After much debate in the Diet, the constitution was passed without major change. Public approval of the document was tremendous. Pamphlets containing a copy of the constitution along with simple diagrams explaining the dramatic governmental changes were published, enough for each household in

Japan. The poison pill of ideas was in place and now there was no going back to the elite controlled government after the end of the occupation. Almost overnight, Japan became a full-fledged democracy. As a measure of how well the constitution was written, the people of Japan have not changed their constitution since it was adopted.^{xvi}

Faced with an American imposed deadline, Iraq's constitution, approved by a national referendum in October, 2005, is also a liberal document. From its Preamble, the goal of the document is for the "establishment of a society of peace and brotherhood and cooperation so we can create a new Iraq, Iraq of the future, without sectarianism, racial strife, regionalism, discrimination or isolation." Although the Iraqi Constitution establishes Islam as the state religion of Iraq and that no law can be passed that contradicts this, Chapter 1 balances this by saying, "(b) No law can be passed that contradicts the principles of democracy. (c) No law can be passed that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms outlined in this constitution." Civilian control of the military, basic equality before the law, independence of the judiciary, suffrage for women, property rights, freedom of religion, thought, and conscience, among others, are all guaranteed.^{xvii} Despite the fact that the Constitution mandates a heavily socialized economy from an economic standpoint, it is clear that it was written with all the basic freedoms in mind. What is unknown is whether or not these ideas have taken root in the consciousness of the Iraqis or whether they will be able to withstand the turmoil in Iraq today.

Betrayal of these ideals by the occupier can do a great amount of damage to the legitimacy of the occupation, however. Hailed by most Japanese as enlightened and benevolent, many were disillusioned with the outcome of the war crimes trials. "Even Japanese peace activists who endorse the ideals of the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters, and

who have labored to document and publicize Japanese atrocities, cannot defend the American decision to exonerate the Emperor of war responsibility and then, in the chill of Cold war, release and soon afterwards openly embrace accused right-wing war criminals like the later prime minister Kishi Nobusuke.^{xviii} This same disillusionment with the enlightened occupier occurred in Iraq. In the summer of 2003, Bremer cancelled local elections in Najaf when he feared that a candidate who opposed the US would win.^{xix} Hypocrisy does not engender trust.

The Golden Hour

Security is essential to Phase IV operations. Security is the most basic face of government and the most basic face of legitimacy. “The weeks immediately following the arrival of foreign peacekeepers tend to be a time of maximum possibility. The appearance of an intervening force often produces a combination of shock and relief among the local population. Resistance is unorganized, spoilers unsure of their future. The situation is, in consequence, highly malleable. But the intervening authorities’ capacity to capitalize on these opportunities is inevitably limited by the absence of many components of the mission. To take advantage of this “Golden Hour” that often follows the onset of “peace” the mission leadership will need to have at its disposal upon arrival a minimum set of assets, including troops, police, civil administrators, and humanitarian workers, followed quickly by judicial and penal experts with funded plans for police training and for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.”^{xx} Planning for Operation Blacklist took this into account. Planning for Phase IV in Iraq did not.

Continuous evaluation of the state of the Government of Japan up until the end days of the war allowed planners to make adjustments as needed. If the GOJ was not going to remain viable, then US forces would have to move in to fill the void. Because of the unknowns, nothing was left to chance during the occupation of Japan. As the Reports of General MacArthur state, "It could be assumed that at best there would be an attitude of non-cooperation in Japan and at worst, armed resistance in many parts of the islands." With this in mind, the first occupation forces would land at strategic centers (the greater Tokyo area, Sasebo, the Osaka area, etc...), and rapidly turn those into US strongholds. From those strategic centers, occupation forces would move out to secure major political centers and avenues of sea communications, such as the mouth of Tokyo Bay. Next, food distribution routes and general overland and sea communications routes would be established.^{xxi}

However, as the occupying troops fanned out into the country, they soon realized that Japan was not about to disintegrate. Japan was a beaten country, but the Emperor had asked his people on the radio to not to let Japan fall apart and to help with its rebuilding and preserve its national identity.^{xxii} Because local police forces remained on the job, humanitarian assistance resources were able move to where they were needed, unhindered.

Much has been made of the looting during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since no Iraqi police were present and US forces were not there in sufficient numbers to compensate, government offices were stripped; computers, desks, files, even power transmission lines disappeared.^{xxiii} This contributed to the great difficulties providing power, water, and an effective Information Operations campaign throughout the summer of 2003, all greatly hampering the occupation. Although not as well known, looting in Japan was far more extensive and damaging to the occupation. Estimates in excess of 100 billion Yen

worth of government stores and property disappeared in the weeks preceding and following the surrender. Most of it ended up in the hands of large businesses and important individuals, destined for the black market.^{xxiv}

Japanese forces began to demobilize themselves even before the first US troops landed. Operation Blacklist planning included a robust program for quick disarmament that continued what the Japanese had started on their own. Troops within Japan were completely demobilized by December 1945.^{xxv} Over three million Japanese soldiers and sailors abroad were returned to the homeland – most of them before 1948. Weapons stores were inventoried in detail and systematically destroyed.^{xxvi} In contrast, Iraq's army and military infrastructure simply vanished in the whirlwind of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A memo from General Fellers, MacArthur's Military Secretary, included the following line: "In effecting our bloodless invasion, we requisitioned the services of the Emperor. By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms and are being rapidly demobilized. Through his act hundreds of thousands of American casualties were avoided and the war terminated far ahead of schedule."^{xxvii} Even through all of this, SCAP recognized its shortfalls in manpower. By the end of 1948, there was 1 US soldier per 670 Japanese, one Japanese policeman per 640 Japanese, and one military policeman per 22,800 Japanese. These ratios were recognized as "insufficient to counter a serious public disturbance or an aggressive fifth column."^{xxviii} But unlike in Iraq no such disturbance or fifth column emerged.

Rand Corporation's *Beginner's Guide to Nation Building* states, "If spoilers are able to separate the population from the government and acquire its active support, they increase the likelihood of an insurgency. In the end, the exercise of political power depends on the

tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”^{xxix}

Legitimacy is fundamentally the agreement of the population to be ruled.

In contrast to the far-reaching planning for Operation Blacklist, planning for Phase IV operations in Iraq were disjointed, insufficient in scope, and not well publicized, even to the troops. Further, the military and civilian leaders chose to ignore most of the planning that had been done, surprising their peers by making dramatic changes without consulting them. General Franks, without consulting General McKiernan, the ground commander in Iraq, began to make changes to the post occupation plan almost immediately by reducing the number of US troops that would be part of the occupation. Contrary to the ill-publicized Phase IV plan, Franks wanted to turn Iraq over to civil authorities as soon as possible and trim down an already deficient force. He envisioned having as few as 30,000 troops in Iraq by September, 2003.^{xxx} Hindered from the beginning by the lack of troops and the lack of police to provide security throughout Iraq, the leadership of the CPA devastated all security efforts. Bremer’s CPA Order No. 1 alienated the government leadership. Order No. 2 alienated the military, police, and other security forces. Hundreds of thousands of influential men who could have been potentially working with the CPA to rebuild Iraq were now on the streets, without jobs, and with no skills save skills with weapons. In the months after WWII, Japan was able to demobilize and destroy all of its weapons stashes, including its large stores of chemical weapons. Iraqi armories and hidden caches were heavily looted, the weapons and ammunition falling into the hands of insurgents because of lack of control of these vital sites. Good intentions devastated the Golden Hour.

With an insurgency now building in earnest, the UN and most Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) leaving because of the devastating bombing of UN Headquarters on

August 19, 2003, and no Iraqi security forces to assist, the situation in Iraq grew dire.^{xxxix} US troops, already stretched thin, were forced to take over providing humanitarian services. Lack of security means a lack of humanitarian aid. The military is forced to fill in to provide this aid, which means even less security and less aid and more troops diverted from security in an every deepening cycle. After four years of various strategies, troop levels, and assistance from the Iraqi government, the security situation is still deficient and is still hampering progress. The perception of illegitimacy, fueled by internal forces, external agents, corruption, and age old conflict, is considerable in Iraq.

Unity of Command

Perhaps not as obviously tied to legitimacy, Unity of Command is a principle of war that is just as important during peacekeeping operations as it is during high-intensity conflict. Fractured command relationships or frequent turnover of command authority undermines the legitimacy of the occupying power to both internal and external perception.

There was no question as to who was in charge in Japan during the occupation. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur continued the larger than life status that he'd had for many years. In addition to his proven military ability, his experiences rebuilding the Philippine army in the 1930s gave him key insights into the nation building process ahead of him in Japan. Perhaps his greatest trait was his immensely powerful presence. In a nation accustomed to living under the rule of powerful figures, such as a Shogun or the Emperor, MacArthur's presence was comforting. Although he rarely left his headquarters in Tokyo, the Japanese public felt that they knew him well. "Japanese at all levels of society embraced the new supreme commander with an ardor hitherto reserved for the emperor, and commonly treated GHQ with the deference they had until recently accorded

their own military leaders.” MacArthur himself received hundreds of letters a day from the Japanese – some of the group petition variety, but the vast majority received, were from individuals, praising his work.^{xxxii}

Unity of command is essential to peacekeeping, but so is consistency in command. Well before the invasion of Japan, General MacArthur was designated as the commander of the occupation. He stayed until relieved by President Truman in April 1951. Not only was MacArthur present through almost the entire occupation period, so was most of his staff and most of the military units that started the occupation.^{xxxiii} The 11th Airborne Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 24th and 25th Division were all still present in Japan until the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950. Corporate knowledge stayed corporate despite a large turnover in men because of post-war demobilization.

The contrast with OIF is dramatic. Within the first five months of the occupation, the Iraqis saw a revolving door of personalities. General Franks, the head of CENTCOM, was relieved by General Abizaid and then retired. Jay Garner, the civilian head of ORHA for about a month, was replaced by Paul Bremer, the civilian head of the CPA. And General McKiernan, CFLCC during OIF, was replaced by LTG Sanchez as Commander Joint Task Force-7. Neither Bremer, nor Lt Gen Sanchez, who had been promoted from the commander of the 1st Armored Division, to V Corps commander, to CJTF-7 in less than a month, had been present during CENTCOM’s planning for post-conflict operations. It became clear very quickly that both seemed to have abandoned, ignored, or simply not been aware of the plan that was in place. Additionally, the command relationship between General Sanchez and Mr. Bremer was never defined. As a result, neither entity worked with the other, and the heads of both organizations clashed regularly. No one above them sorted the situation

out.^{xxxiv} Finally, large troop rotations early in the occupation caused problems as differing occupation techniques and philosophies combined with major losses of corporate knowledge caused much animosity with the Iraqis.^{xxxv}

When General MacArthur left Japan in April, 1951, a Tokyo crowd of an estimated size of two million Japanese gathered to cheer him and thank him for the work that he'd done. Talk of memorials and statues to his memory abounded.^{xxxvi} MacArthur was a genuine hero to the Japanese. When Paul Bremer turned over authority to Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi in June 2004, he did so in a secret ceremony, then snuck away to Baghdad Airport, and flew back to the US. His departure address was pre-recorded and later played on Iraqi television.

Conclusions

What lessons can we take from these two case studies for future Phase IV operations? First, planning for Phase IV is essential. It should start as early as possible and should be disseminated to all levels of the chain. Units should be trained with stability operations in mind as well as for combat.

Second, a strong leader, civilian or military, should be identified early in the planning process and included in all phases of this planning. This person should be available to work within the occupied country for at least two years after the conclusion of Phase III operations.

Third, the more that the indigenous government or security forces that can be used during stability operations, the better. Efforts should be made to include local civil servants and security forces in Phase IV as early as possible as this can bring buy in and can put a local face on the operation.

Fourth, planners should remember that ideas such as democracy, freedom of speech and religion, personal property rights, etc... are extremely powerful ideas that aren't well known in most of the areas that the US will be most likely be involved with in the future. The sooner these ideas can be effectively introduced to the occupied country the better.

Lastly, and most importantly, security is the face of legitimacy. Without effective security, all other efforts will fail. Sufficient forces to govern the entire nation should arrive within the Golden Hour. The Japanese tolerated conditions that Iraqis take for granted for many years in relative silence, because they had security. "During the occupation of Japan, incidents of violence were virtually unknown," yet they lived in devastated cities, had a massive refugee and repatriation crisis, hyper-inflation, and died by the thousands due to malnutrition.^{xxxvii} Japanese electrical power was not adequate until 1948.^{xxxviii} Food consumption did not reach pre-war levels until 1952, and pre-war industrial production until 1955.^{xxxix} Iraq had no humanitarian crisis, electrical power levels were back to pre-war levels by October of 2003, and possesses an incredible amount of oil that could assist in rebuilding, yet that nation's future is in doubt.^{xl} Although Iraq is not yet a lost cause, by squandering the Golden Hour in Iraq, the US may have planted the seeds of destruction for that nation and created far bigger problems for the future.

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- ⁱ Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase Volume 1 Supplement; 1994 pp 24-5.
- ⁱⁱ Ibid p 56.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Gewertz, Looking at Germany
- ^{iv} Military-To-Military Contacts: Personal Observations – The El Salvador Case, Waghelstein, p 4.
- ^v Embracing Defeat, Dower, p 281.
- ^{vi} Ibid, pp 324-5.
- ^{vii} MacArthur in Japan, p 203.
- ^{viii} Ibid, pp 73-4.
- ^{ix} Cobra II, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, p 531
- ^x Ibid, pp 167-8.
- ^{xi} Fiasco, Ricks, p 158-60.
- ^{xii} Beginner's Guide to Nation Building, Dobbins, et al, Rand Corporation, p 34
- ^{xiii} Ricks, p 162.
- ^{xiv} Beginner's Guide, p 100.
- ^{xv} Dower, pp 360-373.
- ^{xvi} Looking At Germany
- ^{xvii} Iraqi Constitution
- ^{xviii} Dower, p 562.
- ^{xix} Gordon, et al, p 563.
- ^{xx} Dobbins, et al, p 15.
- ^{xxi} Reports of MacArthur, p. 6.
- ^{xxii} Dower p 38.
- ^{xxiii} Ricks, p 138; Gordon, et al, p 536.
- ^{xxiv} Dower, p 114.
- ^{xxv} Reports of MacArthur, p 122.
- ^{xxvi} Reports of MacArthur p 53.
- ^{xxvii} Dower p 299.
- ^{xxviii} Reports of MacArthur, p 267.
- ^{xxix} Dobbins, p 21
- ^{xxx} Gordon, et al, p 527.
- ^{xxxi} Ricks, p 216.
- ^{xxxii} Dower, p 227.
- ^{xxxiii} Reports p 63, Plate No. 22.
- ^{xxxiv} Gordon, et al, p 560.
- ^{xxxv} Ibid, p 564.
- ^{xxxvi} Dower, pp 548-9.
- ^{xxxvii} Gewertz
- ^{xxxviii} Reports of MacArthur, p 214.
- ^{xxxix} Dower, pp 544, 558-9.
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